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Abstract—SCADA systems are required to deal with 
increasingly complex and critical situation. They must 
constantly evolve towards integrated decision making and 
policy driven by cyber security requirements. The current 
research stream in that domain aims, accordingly, to foster 
the smartness of the field equipment’s and processes, which 
principally exist through the generic concept of SCADA 
components. Those components are governed by policies 
which depending on the components roles and the evolution 
of the crisis, also confer to the latter the latitude to react 
based on their own perception of the crisis evolution. These 
components latitude is calculated based on as the component 
smartness and is strongly determined by, and depending on, 
the cyber safety of the component environment. Actual work 
related to crisis management tends to consider that 
components evolve and are organized in systems but as far 
as we know, no systemic solution exists which integrates all 
of the above requirements. Therefore, we do believe that 
such an integrated solution could bring many advantages 
including the integration of cyber-security protection by 
means of security policy generation. Therefore, in the fram 
of the CockpitCI project, we have decided to frame an 
innovative version of ArchiMate® for the SCADA 
component modeling purpose to enrich the SCADA 
component collaborations and, more particularly, the 
description of their behavior endorsed in the cyber-policy. 
Our work has been illustrated in the frame of a critical 
infrastructure in the field of petroleum supply chains which 
is a highly sensitive research topic. 
Keywords—ArchiMate®, metamodel, SCADA, multi-
components system, trust, petroleum supply chains, critical 
infrastructure 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Enterprise architecture models are frameworks that 
allow representing the information system (IS) of 
companies in (or on a set of) schemas called views. Those 
models have undergone major improvements during the 
first decade of the 21st century and some significant 
frameworks have been developed since, such as 
ArchiMate® [11], the Zachman framework [12], or 
TOGAF [13]. These models are traditionally structured in 
layers that correspond to different levels of the 
organizations’ IS. The business layer, for instance, models 
the concept that exists at the business layer such as the 
processes, the actors, their business roles, and so forth and 
which are supported or represented by IT application 
layers. At this application layer the concepts of the IS that 
are modeled are the applications, the databases, or for 
instance, the application data. The advantages of these 
enterprise architecture models are that they allow 
improving the connections between the concepts from each 
layer and, thereby, allow a better integration and an 
enhanced support for the decision making processes. Up to 
now, components represented at the business layers 
[1][2][7] have been considered human actors playing 
business roles. However, rising security requirements for 
the management of heterogeneous and distributed 
architecture calls for a rethinking of distribution of the 
security procedures in both: human and software 
autonomous entities. Although having been handled by 
human employees for years, the management of complex 
systems, nowadays, needs to be shared with intelligent 
software items, often perceived being more adapted to act 
in critical situations. This statement is enforced by the 
characteristic ability of the component to act autonomously 
in open, distributed and heterogeneous environments, in 
connection or not with an upper authority. Acknowledging 
this situation, we are forced to admit that SCADA 
components are no longer to be considered only as basic 
isolated solution deployed to support business activities, 
but that they are part of crisis reaction strategy. Since then, 
acquiring an innovative enterprise architecture framework 
to represent the behaviors of such component appears fully 
justified in view of the arising cyber protection principles 
and required by the practitioners, especially the ones 
engaged in the management of those critical 
infrastructures. 
In this paper, we propose to explore ArchiMate® and 
to redraw its structure in order to fit with component 
software actors’ specificities and domain constraints. The 
main focus concerns the design and the consideration of 
the policies that are centric concepts related to the 
activation of component’s behaviours. We review the 
SCADA components metamodel and the SCADA layers 
for crisis management and we model the concept of policy 
that represents the engine of the component modeling 
framework in Section II. In Section III, we explain the 
policy engineering approach. In Section IV, we present a 
structured method for modeling policy according to cyber-
security threats and in Section V, a case study in the 
petroleum supply chain illustrates the exploitation of the 
enhanced ArchiMate®. Finally, Section VI concludes the 
paper. 
II. SCADA METAMODEL BACKGROUND 
This section recalls our previous work in the field of 
SCADA system modelling. We first introduce the 
SCADA metamodel, followed by the SCADA modelling 
layers. 
A. SCADA metamodelling insights 
Our goal in modelling the SCADA system into a layered 
architecture metamodel is to provide CI operators with the 
tools for governing SCADA systems (monitoring and 
decision making). In previous works [2], we have 
elaborated such a SCADA metamodel based on the 
ArchiMate® language to give a multiple layered view of a 
SCADA component using policies. To generate the latter, 
we realized a specialization of the original ArchiMate® 
metamodel for SCADA components. Firstly, we redefined 
the Core of the metamodel in order to figure out the 
concept of the Policy (Fig. 1.). The Core represents the 
handling of Passive Structures by Active Structures during 
the realization of Behaviours. For the Active Structures 
and the Behaviour, the Core differentiates between 
external concepts, which represent how the architecture is 
being perceived by the external components (as a Service 
Provider attainable by an Interface), and the internal 
concept which is composed of Structure Elements (Roles, 
Components) and linked to a Policy Execution concept. 
Passive Structures contains Object (e.g. data and 
organizational object) which represents architecture 
knowledge. Secondly, the concept of Policy was defined 
in accordance to the SCADA metamodel. The proposed 
representation is composed of three elements defining the 
Policy: 
1. “Event” is defined as something done by a Structure 
Element which generates the execution of a Policy. 
2. “Context” symbolizes a configuration of Passive 
Structure that allows the Policy to be executed (e.g. a 
security level or the value of an object). 
3. “Responsibility” [9, 10] is defined as a state assigned 
to an component (human or software) to specify 
obligations and rights in a specific context [2]. 
Thereby, responsibilities correspond to a set of 
behaviours that have to be performed by Structure 
Elements. This behaviour can use Object from Passive 
Structure or modify values. 
With these three elements, we generate an auxiliary 
Policy artefact mirroring the execution of a set of 
Responsibilities in a specific Context and in response to a 
determined Event. Concepts and colours were taken from 
the original ArchiMate® metamodel, except for 
Organizational Function and the Application Function 
which were replaced by the Organizational Policy 
concept and the Application Policy concept. Through the 
Policy Concept, we show that each operation done by the 
SCADA components can be transferred into a Policy 
Execution. Although there is a semantic difference in 
ArchiMate® between the application and the user who 
exploits the application, in the SCADA domain, we 
consider that actors and roles are played by components 
that we define as being specific Structure Elements acting 
in CI context. Hence, three layers structure the metamodel 
for the SCADA components:  
4. The Organizational Layer offers products and services 
to external customers, which are realized in the 
organization by organizational processes performed by 
Organizational Roles according to Organizational 
Policies. 
5. The Application Layer supports the Organizational 
Layer with Application Services which are realized by 
Applications according to Application Policies. 
6. The Technology Layer offers Infrastructure Services 
needed to run applications, realized by computer and 
communication hardware and system software. 
Based on this analysis, we had defined the 
Organizational Policy as the rules which define the 
organizational responsibilities and govern the execution 
of behaviours, at the organization domain, that serve the 
product domain in response to a process domain 
occurring in a specific context, which is symbolized by a 
configuration of the information domain. And we defined 
the Application Policy as the rules that define the 
application responsibilities and govern the execution, at 
the application domain, of behaviours that serve the data 
domain to achieve the application strategy. 
B. SCADA metamodel layers 
The three layers which structure the SCADA metamodel 
(Fig. 1) are the Organizational, Application and Technical 
Layers: 
The Organizational Layer highlights the organizational 
processes and their links to the Application Layer. At first 
the Organizational Layer is defined by an Organizational 
Role (e.g. Alert Detection Component). This role, 
accessible from the outside through an Organizational 
Interface, performs behaviour on the basis of the 
organization's policy (Organizational Policy) associated 
with the role. Then, the component is able (depending on 
its role) to interact with other roles to perform behaviour; 
this is symbolized by the concept of Role Collaboration 
[2]. Organizational Policies are behavioural components 
of the organization whose goal is to achieve an 
Organizational Service to a role following Events. 
Organizational Services are contained in Products 
accompanied by Contracts. Contracts are formal or 
informal specifications of the rights and obligations 
associated with a Product. Values are defined as an 
appreciation of a Service or a Product that the 
Organization attempts to provide or acquire. The 
Organizational Objects define units of information that 
relate to an aspect of the organization. 
The Application layer is used to represent the 
Application Components and their interactions with the 
Application Service derived from the Organizational 
Policy of the Organizational Layer. The concept of the 
components in the metamodel is very similar to the 
components concept of UML [11] and allows representing 
any part of the program. Components use Data Object 
which is a modelling concept of objects and object types 
of UML. Interconnection between components is 
modelled by the Application Interface in order to 
represent the availability of a component to the outside [2] 
(implementing a part or all of the services defined in the 
Application Service). The concept of Collaboration from 
the Organizational Layer is present in the Application 
Layer as the Application Collaboration and can be used to 
symbolize the cooperation (temporary) between 
components for the realization of behaviour. Application 
Policy represents the behaviour that is carried out by the 
components. 
The Technical Layer is used to represent the structural 
aspect of the system and highlights the links between the 
Technical Layer and the Application Layer and how 
physical pieces of information called Artefacts are 
produced or used. The main concept of the Technical 
layer is the Node which represents a computational 
resource on which Artefacts can be deployed and 
executed. The Node can be accessed by other Nodes or by 
components of the Application Layer. A Node is 
composed of a Device and a System Software [4]. Devices 
are physical computational resources where Artefacts are 
deployed when the System Software represents a software 
environment for types of components and objects. 
Communication between the Nodes of the Technology 
Layer is defined logically by the Communication Path and 
physically by the Network.  
The complete SCADA metamodel is the union of the 
three layers. As shown below, new connections between 
the layers have appeared. For the Passive Structure we 
observe that Artefact of the Technical Layer realizes Data 
Object of the Application Layer which, itself, realizes 
Organizational Object of the Organizational layer.  
The Behaviour element connections show that the 
Application Service uses the Organizational Policy to 
determine the services which it proposes. In the same 
way, the Technical Layer bases its Infrastructure Service 
upon the Application Policy of the Application Layer. 
Concerning the Active Structure connections, the Role 
concept determines, along with the Application 
Component, the Interface provided in the Application 
layer. The Interface of the Technical Layer is also based 
on the components of the Application Layer.  
C. Policy modelling 
In the Organizational Layer, Organizational 
Policy can be represented as an UML Use Case [11] 
where concepts of Roles represent the Actors which 
have Responsibilities in the Use Case, and the 
Collaboration concepts show the connections between 
them. Concepts of Products, Value and Organizational 
Service provide the Goal of the Use Case. Pre- and 
Post-conditions model the context of the Use Case and 
are symbolized in the metamodel by the Event concept 
(pre-condition) and the Organizational Object (pre-
/post-condition). In the Application Layer, Application 
Policy is defined as the realization of Responsibilities by 
the Application Domain in a configuration of the Data 
Domain. UML provides support for modelling the 
behaviour performed by the Application Domain as 
Sequence Diagram. Configuration of the Data Domain 
can be expressed as Pre-conditions of the Sequence 
Diagram and symbolized by the execution of a test-
method on the lifeline of the diagram. 
III. POLICY ENGINEERING 
To engineer the SCADA policies, two steps are necessary. 
The first one concerns the modelling of each SCADA 
component according to the metamodel. The second one 
concerns the detection and identification of the 
connections amongst each composing artefact of the 
component models. 
Figure 1: Three layers of SCADA system metamodel extracted from [2] 
A. SCADA metamodel instance per component 
This first step aims at providing the SCADA operators 
and managers with a holistic and integrated view of the 
SCADA architecture building blocks. To that end, the 
SCADA metamodel is instantiated for each architecture 
component. This step is achieved by shaping the 
component according to the three abstractions typically 
advocated by the enterprise architecture paradigm. This 
step allows discovering the building artefacts of the 
components as well as the connections amongst the 
components artefacts. This unified representation of each 
component implies paramount outcomes for the SCADA 
operator since it confers to the latter a global functional 
insight of each component irrespective of any 
implementation or vendors’ influence. 
B. Policy semantic investigation 
The unitary SCADA component models are used in the 
second step to picture the global structure of the SCADA 
architecture and of the connections, in terms of policies, 
amongst the components of the architecture. Fig. 2 
highlights the two types of policies recovered in SCADA 
architecture: 
1) Cognitive Policy 
Cognitive Policies [12] are represented in blue in Fig. 2. 
They represent policies which govern the behaviour of 
one artefact of the component architecture. This policy 
specifies the rule that the Responsible artefact needs to 
follow for the execution of a defined activity in a specific 
execution context. This rule is dictated by the artefact 
which exists in the same component or in another one. 
The artefact which generates the policy is the Master 
artefact and the one which execute it is the Slave artefact. 
The Cognitive Policy morphology is articulated on the 
following set of attributes (perceived by [13]): Master 
artefact, Slave artefact, Master component, Slave 
component, Behaving rule, Trigger item, Usage context, 
Priority extension (Table I).  
Table I. Cognitive policy attributes’ name and attributes’ ID 
Attribute Name Attribute’s ID 
Master artefact CP-Ma-art 
Salve artefact CP-S-art 
Master component CP-Ma-Com 
Slave component CP-S-Com 
Behaving rule CP-Ru 
Trigger item CP-TI 
Usage context CP-UC 
Priority extension CP-prior 
The application schema of a CP, as presented in Fig. 2, 
obeys the two following controls: (1) the communication 
path is from a Master structural concept to a Slave 
behavioral concept or (2) the communication path is from 
a Master behavioural artefact to another Slave behavioural 
artefact.  
 
Figure 2. Two types of policy for SCADA. CP in blue and PP in red. 
1) Permissive Policy 
Permissive Policies are represented in red in Fig. 2. They 
represent policies which govern the knowledge 
acquisition rules from the Master to the Slave artefact 
[14]. This knowledge acquisition traditionally takes the 
form of SCADA states data accessed or provided in order 
to provide the Responsible with the access (of in, out, 
in_out types [16]) to successive Cognitive Policies in 
case of occurring events. The Permissive Policies 
morphology is articulated on the following set of 
attributes [(perceived by [15]): Master artefact, Slave 
artefact, Master component, Slave component, Permission 
rules, Pre-permission conditions, Master permission 
cardinality, Slave permission cardinality, and Cognitive 
constraints (Table II) - sustained by Cognitive Policy 
states). 
Table II. Permissive Policy attributes’ name and attributes’ ID 
Attribute Name Attribute ID 
Master artefact PP-Ma-art 
Slave artefact PP-S-art 
Master component PP-Ma-Com 
Slave component PP-S-Com 
Permission rules PP-Ru 
Permission conditions PP-Condi 
Master permission cardinality PP-Ma-Car 
Slave permission cardinality PP-S-Car 
Cognitive constraints PP-Co.con. 
 
The application schema of a CP, as highlighted in Figure 
2, obeys the two following controls: (1) the 
communication path is from a Master structural artefact to 
a Slave informational artefact or (2) the communication 
path is from a Master behavioural artefact to a Slave 
informational artefact. 
IV. POLICY IDENTIFICATION METHOD 
Designing automatic reaction strategy requires a rigorous 
two phase’s policy elaboration mechanism: 
A. Policy scheme identification steps 
The first phase is itself structured in three steps. The first 
one aims at identifying the structure of the CI architecture 
in terms of unitary modules (components), including their 
three layers of abstraction build upon the SCADA 
metamodel (i.e., organization, application, and technical). 
The second step aims at identifying the external 
parameters of the CI such as potential threat probes and 
indicators that may impact the CI normal functioning 
(flood, hijacking,…), the physical environment, and/or the 
contractual SLA (service level agreement). The third step 
aims at identifying the reaction policies which may be of 
two types: Cognitive (artefact of a CI component which 
needs information from succeeding artefacts – Blue 
connections on Figure 1) or Permissive (artefact of a CI 
component which needs permission upon the succeeding 
lower layer artefacts – Red connections on Figure 1). Both 
types of policies are explained in [1] and [2]. 
B. Policy scheme formalisation steps 
After policies being identified, the second phase of the 
method aims at formalizing policy scheme using a three 
steps approach. The first one aims at depicting Master-
Slave communication artefacts (organization-
organization, organization-technical, technical-technical), 
the second aims at identifying the cognitive and 
permissive behaviour based on the automatic reaction 
strategy, and the last one aims at formalizing the policies 
accordingly. This latter is function of the policy type and 
is achieved, on one hand, with the inter-artefacts 
knowledge requirement, external probes and monitoring 
tools in case of Cognitive policy and with the reaction 
strategy with the requirement of access to artefacts in case 
of Permissive policy. 
V. AUTOMATIC REACTION STRATEGY 
ARCHITECTURE 
Practitioners of the critical infrastructures call for an 
integrated approach for the architecture components 
management. However, up to date, the automatic reaction 
strategy has been perceived and addressed as isolated 
system. Its integration with the reaction CI components 
such as the antivirus, firewall, IDS, RTU, correlation 
engine and so forth has remained lacunar mainly due to 
the lack of a common representation language. The 
SCADA component metamodel, supported by the method 
for policy scheme identification, allows facing this 
integration by considering the Automatic Reaction 
Strategy (ARS) as an integral part of the SCADA 
architecture. 
 
Figure 3. Component’s Policy Path 
This ARS is defined by “the rules (r1n ) uses by the Main 
CI Investigator to choose between the available reaction 
policy (RP1m ) option in accordance with the critical 
infrastructure Expected Automatization Levels (EAL) and 
considering the RP at the Organization (o) and/or at the 
Application (a) level. Amongst the main artefacts which 
construct the reaction unit supporting the ARS 
architecture, we denote two main artefacts at the 
organizational layer (Yellow part of Figure 4): 
• The Main CI Investigator which is a type of Business 
actor, that accesses the Expected Automatization Levels 
and which is associated to the Organizational Automatic 
Reaction Strategy. This Main CI Investigator acts as the 
guarantor of the component RPo and RPa [3].  
• The Organizational Automatic Reaction Strategy, 
defines by the rule, is, hence, modelled by means of a 
business function. It encompasses the expected 
automatization according to external constraints, SCADA 
topology, CI system, Regulatory framework, Security 
level (provided through CERN papers for instances), and 
so forth. This expected automatization levels is thus 
associated to different types of application or organization 
objects. As illustrated in Figure 2, this business function is 
correlated to Analytical function policy, correlation 
policy, or visualisation policy following the reaction 
architecture modelled using ArchiMate® (see Table I) 
from Figure 8. 
 
Figure 4. Reaction Unit 
Equivalently, three main artefacts compose the application 
layer (Blue part of Figure 4): 
• The Application Automatic Reaction Strategy, also 
defined by the rule, is modelled by means of an 
application function. This latter is also naturally 
associated to the Expected Automatization Level and is 
accessed by the Main CI Investigator. 
• The Application ARS is associated with the 
Detection/correlation collaboration which facilitates the 
information exchanges between the CI application 
modules and realizes the application policy deployment to 
the CI component application artefacts. 
• The Application ARS is also guaranteed by the Main CI 
Investigator and is realized following the reaction 
architecture from Figure 1, by the Alert analysis Module, 
the Detection ZW 0.1 Module and the Correlation 
Application 1.1. 
VI. CASE STUDY IN PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The represent the modeling of ArchiMate components 
metamodel and policy generation, we complete, in this 
paper, the case study presented in [23]: 
Partially represents the real-world petroleum supply chain 
planning problem of Petrobras […] Petrobras has 59 petroleum 
exploration sites among which 43 are offshore, 11 refineries that 
are located along the country’s territory and a large number of 
facilities such as terminals and pipeline networks. Refinery sites 
are concentrated mainly in southern [of the country] where 7 sites 
are found, 4 of which represent 47% of the company’s processing 
capacity. These refineries are located in the most important and 
strategic consumer markets. Therefore, the present work 
addresses the supply chain comprised of these 4 refineries, 
namely: REVAP, RPBC, REPLAN and RECAP (Fig. 2). Five 
terminals compose the storage facilities, namely: SEBAT, 
SEGUA, CUBATAO, SCS and OSBRA; and a pipeline network 
for crude oil supply and another for product distribution compose 
the transportation facilities. 
 
 
Figure 5. Petroleum architecture plan 
The broadcasting mechanism (Figure 6) aims at sending 
alerts to the authorities using technology such as the SMS 
or tweets whenever a cyber-attack occurs. This section 
presents the core components of the broadcasting 
mechanism. The solution relies on a MAS technology on 
the top of the JADE framework [6]. SCADA component 
are disseminated on three layers of the infrastructure 
corresponding to geographical region (city, region or 
country) and they retrieve information from probes 
located in control stations and on the petroleum 
distribution channel and representing with different 
values: pressure, CERN alert and estimated cyber-crime 
level. The components that compose the critical 
architecture are the following: 
The Alert Correlation Engine (ACE) collect, aggregates 
and analyses information coming from probes deployed 
over the network and control stations. Confirmed alerts 
are sent to the Policy Instantiation Engine (PIE). The PIE 
receives confirmed alert from the ACE, set the severity 
level and the extent of the geographical response. The PIE 
instantiates high level alert messages, to be deployed. 
Finally the high level alert messages are transferred to the 
Message Supervising Point (MSP). The MSP, as 
explained in detailed in [9] is composed of two modules. 
The Policy Analysis (PA) is in charge of analysing the 
policies previously instantiated by the PIE. For that, the 
Policy Status database stores all communication policies 
and their current status (in progress, not applicable, by-
passed, enforced, removed…) so that the PA module can 
check the consistency of the newly received message to be 
deployed. The second module is the Component 
Configuration Mapper that selects the appropriate 
communication channel. Figure 7 presents two different 
kinds of Message Broadcasting Point (MBP). Indeed, 
another advantage of MAS is that it is easy to implement 
from a model, specific components in order to perform 
specific tasks. Concretely it enables us to use different 
channel of communication (e.g. SMS, e-mail, micro-
blogging) to send alerts to citizens, hospitals, etc. By this 
way our petroleum supply interruption prevention system 
is easily extensible for future communications facilities. 
MBPs receive generic alert messages from the MSP. Then 
a specific parser converts the incoming alert message to 
the appropriate format according to the channel. 
To consider the mutual trust between components, each 
component maintains within it a database of levels of trust 
towards its pairs. This means e.g. that the MBP has a 
dedicated level of trust for the ACE and the MSP.  
The broadcasting alert architecture presented in this 
section is based on the ReD project [7]. The ReD 
(Reaction after Detection) project defines and designs a 
solution to enhance the detection/reaction process and 
improves the overall resilience of critical infrastructures. 
Figure 8 introduces the developed architecture illustrated 
with our cyber intrusion alert system. The flow is 
supposed to begin with an alert detected by a probe. 
 
Figure 6. Broadcasting mechanism inside 
This alert is send to the ACE component (City layer) that does 
or does not confirm the alert to the PIE. Afterwards, the PIE 
decides to apply new policies or to forward the alert to an 
ACE from a higher layer (Region Layer). The PIE component 
sends the policies to the MSP component, which decides 
which MBP is able to transform the high level alert message 
into an understandable format for the selected communication 
channel.  
In order to manage access rights, we have incorporated to ReD 
a Context Rights Management module (CRM). Block on the 
right on Figure 9. The CRM is in charge of providing access 
rights to components. The CRM uses the component links and 
the crisis context database. The first database includes the link 
between two components (type of contextual access right). 
The second database includes a set of crisis contexts. Thanks 
to these databases the CRM component is able to detect the 
component right to access each other’s at the operational layer 
depending on the context.  
 
Figure 7. Detailed reaction architecture 
A. ACE Organizational layer 
In the Organizational layer of the ACE Component (Figure 
11) we have represented separately the monitoring aspect from 
the transaction aspect. We call a transaction a communication 
of information from one component to another (e.g. the ACE 
sends an alert to a PIE) and then we consider the monitoring 
as the representation of information from an external device. 
Firstly the Organizational Role of the ACE is represented as a 
Collaboration of the PIE Role and the Device Role. Each Role 
of the Collaboration communicates with the ACE through a 
proper Organizational Interface one for the monitoring and 
another one for the transaction. ACE Role is providing two 
Organizational Services depending on only one 
Organizational Policy which is dealing with two Events 
respectively for the monitoring and the transaction. Secondly 
the two Organizational Services provided by the ACE 
component are regrouped into a correlation service 
symbolized by the Product concept. This Product has the 
objective Value to reduce a crisis by giving a guaranty of short 
reaction time represented by the Contract concept. Finally the 
Contract is applied on Organizational Object as monitoring 
information and transaction information.  
B. ACE Application layer 
For the Application layer of the ACE Component (Figure 11) 
we found the separation between the transaction and the 
monitoring. Application Services for transactions and 
monitoring are, as in the Organizational Policy, linked to only 
one Application Policy. To highlight the collaboration 
between the ACE and the Monitored Device, we created a 
Collaboration concept named Monitoring Administration and 
shows that this collaboration is constituted of the Components 
of the ACE and the Components of the Device. Device’s 
components use the Application Monitoring Interface to 
communicate with the ACE’s components and the ACE’s 
components are composed of the Application Monitoring 
Interface. We use the same approach for the transaction part 
and rapidly show that the ACE’s components are composed of 
two interfaces deserving the two Application Services. Again 
the Application layer contains Data Object as Transaction 
Messages and Monitoring Messages used by the different 
Application Components of the layer.  
 
Figure 8. ACE component model 
C. ACE Technical layer 
We found in the Technical layer of the ACE Component 
(Figure 11) another representation of the two collaborators of 
the ACE component. Transaction and Monitoring 
Infrastructure are separated from each other. Both of them 
have Infrastructure Service connected to the ACE 
component’s Node and an Infrastructure Interface where the 
collaborators can interact with it. Each Node is respectively 
connected to a Communication Path (represented by a logical 
Event Queuing) and uses different Artifacts to communicate. 
We have intentionally not instantiated Nodes for readability 
but the reader can easily imagine that an ACE component can 
be deployed on a computer who’s running an operating 
system. Also the Network concept is not defined in our 
instantiation for the same reason. For example Monitoring 
Event Queue between the ACE component and the Device can 
be represented as a Network concept, as an USB cable and for 
the Transaction Event Queue by an RJ45 cable. 
D. ACE Organizational Policy 
To illustrate the Organizational Policies of the ACE we 
choose to represent the monitoring part of the ACE Role as an 
UML Use Case. Monitoring Events are illustrated in the Use 
Case as Extension Points and show their impacts on the 
behaviours realized in the Perform Monitoring Policy. Roles 
are presented as Actors and Collaborations are highlighted by 
the different link between the behaviours. 
E. ACE Application Policy 
Sequences Diagrams have been used to represent the 
behaviours performed by the Application Domain of the ACE 
Component for the Application Policy: Perform Detection. In 
the Sequence Diagram, behaviour of each component is fit to 
his lifeline and in/out Events presented as inter-component 
methods call. Context analyse is performed by the component 
during the execution of his behaviour. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
We have elaborated an innovative version of ArchiMate® 
to enrich the SCADA components collaborations and, more 
particularly, the description of the components behavior 
endorsed in the policy for cyber-crime mitigation. To illustrate 
our work, a case study has been performed in the frame of a 
critical infrastructure related to petroleum supply. This case 
study has allowed illustrating and validating the definition of 
policies according to reaction strategy on the first hand, and 
depending on evolving trust parameters amongst components 
on the other hand. Finally, we have simulated a heterogeneous 
network of ACE and PIE components and where different load 
of malicious components have been integrated. 
The three functions necessary for the enhancement of the 
SCADA architecture management with the automatic reaction 
strategy proposed in this paper are: 
The 1st function aims to support the modelling of SCADA 
components using the generic SCADA language grounded on 
the metamodel for SCADA components. This latter allows 
modelling each component of a SCADA architecture 
following a unique modelling architecture in three abstraction 
layers and enhances the ArchiMate® modelling language with 
the policy concept as a specialization of an 
organizational/application service. This policy is refined using 
the 2nd function onto cognitive or permissive policies and these 
latter semantically enrich the connection between the concepts 
which realizes the SCADA architecture. The 3rd function 
depicted in this paper proposes a two phase’s method for 
Automatic reaction strategy based upon the two succeeding 
functions.  
As future works, additional validations are expected in the 
next months on larger scale infrastructures. In parallel, a 
supporting tool is being developed. The upper validation has 
been allowed by the primary functionalities of it. Additional 
features of that latter will allow modulating the environment 
parameters in which the SCADA components’ network is 
running and thereby, it will allow refining and validating the 
trust based policies evolution along more complex situations.  
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